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INTRODUCTION

This Court entered a Memorandum of Decision on February 23, 1996,
affirming summary judgment for Respondent Calhoun. In accordance with Rule
35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellant Brittner now petitions
this Court for rehearing.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The central issue in this case, whether Respondent Calhoun owed any
duty to Appellant Brittner, is determined solely by the contract between
Respondent Calhoun and the Salt Lake City Airport Authority. The contract
language is unambiguous; therefore, it is unnecessary to rely on information
outside of the contract to resolve the question of Calhoun's duty.
This Court made several critical errors in its decision. First, it failed to
mention or consider specific contract language that shows that Calhoun assumed
a landowner's broad duty of care toward business invitees. Such a duty was not
divided as between the Airport Authority and Calhoun, as is implied by this
Court's decision. Nothing in the contract indicates that the Airport Authority
reserved a duty to inspect, while delegating a duty to clean to Calhoun.
Second, this Court relied on contract language stating that Calhoun would
perform additional or emergency services upon request, but then overlooked the
remaining portion of that phrase, Mor as needed." This language, which must be
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read as imposing an additional requirement beyond "upon request," clearly
shows that Calhoun had a duty above and beyond the duty to clean only when
notified by the Airport Authority.
Finally, the Court failed to address Appellant's argument that Calhoun
had a duty to warn airport travelers of the foreseeable hazards created by the
day-long accumulation of snow. By placing signs at the airport entrances
warning incoming passengers of slippery floors, Calhoun assumed the duty of a
landowner to warn invitees of hazards. Calhoun therefore had a duty to warn
all passengers, not just those arriving via ground transportation.
These errors are material, and make the Court's construction of the
Calhoun-Airport Authority contract factually and legally incorrect. For these
reasons, Appellant Brittner requests that the Court grant her Petition for
Rehearing.

ARGUMENT

A. Calhoun assumed all duties of a landowner in its contract with
the Airport Authority. There is no language in the contract
reserving certain duties to the Airport Authority.
By the terms of its own contract, Calhoun assumed all responsibilities of
a landowner: to protect the public, to provide the labor needed to maintain high
standards of cleanliness, to maintain the premises in a dry condition, to provide
regular maintenance, and to remove spills. In addition, the terms of the contract
2

establish that the standard of care which Calhoun agreed to assume was "above
average." None of this crucial language was mentioned in the Court's decision.
In the contract, Calhoun assumed exclusive "responsibility for
management of the janitorial service program described in this contract
document." Contract §2.01(A), Record at 60. Calhoun further assumed
responsibility to provide all management and labor "required to satisfactorily
maintain the level of cleanliness ordinarily associated with above average
facilities." Contract § 2.01(B), Record at 60 (emphasis added). These terms
are unambiguous, and can only be interpreted as meaning what they say: that
Calhoun assumed the duty to maintain the premises in a clean and safe
condition for the public. This is the duty owed by a landowner toward a
business invitee.
Any doubt as to the nature of the duty assumed by Calhoun is overcome
by the contract term stating that Calhoun will be responsible "for any injuries to,
or the death of any persons, or damage to property resulting form any cause
whatsoever arising out of or in connection with his performance of the Work...."
Contract § 7.01(A), Record at 85. Thus, for any injuries on the premises
resulting from Calhoun's failure to meet its responsibilities under the contract,
i.e., to keep the facility in a clean and dry condition, Calhoun is to be held
responsible. If that assumption of responsibility is not clear enough, Calhoun
also agreed "to indemnity (sic), save harmless and defend City, its agents and
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employees from and against all claims, mechanic's liens, damage, demands,
actions, costs and charges arising out of or by reason of the Contractor's
services at the Airport...." Contract, Agreement § 17(a), Record at 118. Finally,
Calhoun also agreed to provide comprehensive general liability insurance, with
the City as an additional named insured, in the minimum amount of One
Million ($1,000,000) Dollars combined single limit. Contract, Agreement § 5(b),
Record at 111.
The contract between Calhoun and the Airport Authority must be
construed as a whole. When so construed, it is clear that Calhoun did not
assume merely the duty clean when told to do so. It assumed a much greater
duty, as evidenced by the terms cited above. Taken as a whole, these terms
show that the contract between the Airport Authority and Calhoun clearly
delegated the landowner's duty of care to Calhoun.

B. This Court's holding that Calhoun had a duty to clean only when
notified overlooks the remaining crucial language of the sentence in
the contract, "or as needed."
This Court held that Calhoun had a contractual duty to remove or correct
hazards M[o]nly when notified." Memorandum of Decision at 2. But even if the
water on the floor where Appellant Brittner fell was, as decided by this Court,
an emergency situation not remedied by routine cleaning, the contract
specifically states that Calhoun will perform "emergency cleanup," including

4

"maintaining the facility in a dry condition," "upon request of the Airport or as
needed" Contract §2.11(A), Record at 63-4 (emphasis added). This Court's
decision either overlooked the words "or as needed," or interpreted those words
as meaning that Calhoun had to be notified. It is a basic tenet of contract
interpretation that interpretation should not render any language surplusage, if
possible. This Court's interpretation does just that. The words "or as needed"
are rendered meaningless by this Court's decision. Such an interpretation is
legally incorrect.
If Calhoun is required to perform emergency services "as needed," such
language imposes a duty above and beyond the duty to clean when notified of a
spill. This Court must interpret the contract as drafted and signed by the
parties, which unambiguously requires Calhoun to perform emergency services
"as needed."

C. This Court's interpretation of the duty to "police" is not
supported by the contract or by extrinsic evidence.
Calhoun is required by the terms of the contract to create a Work Plan,
which is designed to implement the details of Calhoun's contractual duties. See
Contract at § 2.03(A), Record at 60-61. According to that plan, Calhoun had an
employee assigned to the precise area where Plaintiff fell, at the precise time
that she fell. Work Plan, Record at 205-06. Employee SGC-04 is required "to
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police" the Terminal Unit Two lobby, where Plaintiff fell, between 9:30 p.m.
and 10:15 p.m. every night. Work Plan, Record at 206.
In its decision, this Court interpreted the word "police" as not including a
duty to inspect the area for hazards.

Memorandum of Decision at 2. But the

word "police" is not defined anywhere in the contract. The meaning of the
word can best be discerned from reading the entire description of Employee
SGC-04's duties: "Police all seating area's [sic], remove all debris from area
and sweep or hokey floor in all area's [sic] as needed." Work Plan, Record at
201. This description suggests that Employee SGC-04 is to keep an eye out for
debris on the floor-which would logically include water~and to remove it.
This interpretation is supported by testimony regarding Calhoun's actual
practices. One of the two witnesses to Plaintiffs fall testified that Calhoun
employees are seen regularly between 9 and 11 o'clock p.m. in the area where
Plaintiff fell. Renehan Depo. at 30-31, Record at 238. His description of the
Calhoun employees' work is that they "mop up, sweep up, whatever might need
to be done as maintenance or cleanup-type operation" Id. (emphasis added).
This testimony supports Appellant Brittner's construction of the contractual
"policing" requirement, i.e., that Calhoun is required to inspect for hazards.
The only evidence that can be used to contradict Appellant's construction
of this requirement is the Gomm affidavit describing the practice of "2400"
calls. Gomm Affidavit f 5, Record at 52. But the interpretation of the "2400"
6

calls that is most consistent with the contract as a whole, and therefore most
legally correct, is that the 2400 calls simply implemented the "upon request"
language of the contract. As noted above, there are numerous contractual terms
placing a duty on Calhoun to protect the public, to be responsible for all
injuries, to maintain the facility in a clean and dry condition, and to perform
emergency cleanup as needed. These terms cannot be ignored when interpreting
the meaning of "police."
To interpret the term "police" in a manner that so clearly contradicts all
of these contractual terms is to commit a legal error. Because this Court's
interpretation of the "policing" requirement is not supported by the contract or
by extrinsic evidence, the Court should reconsider its decision.

D. This Court did not address Appellant's argument that Calhoun
had a duty to warn travelers of the hazardous condition of the floors,
in addition to a duty to remedy such condition.
Appellant Brittner has consistently argued that Calhoun had a duty to
warn travelers arriving by air of the potentially hazardous condition of the
floors. According to Steve Ray Gomm, Calhoun's airport manager,
"considerable snowfall" on the day Appellant was injured prompted Calhoun to
place signs warning travelers of the "increased need for caution due to wet floor
conditions." Gomm Affidavit TJ 9, Record at 53. The warning signs placed by
Calhoun on the day of Appellant's injury were visible only to "persons entering
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the airport." Gomm Affidavit ^ 9, Record at 53. No signs were placed within
the airport, even though many travelers, like Appellant, arrive by air and do not
use the airport entrances.
Appellant has argued that Calhoun's actual knowledge of the increased
hazard due to snowfall, regardless of its actual knowledge of the water in which
appellant slipped and fell, created a duty of diligence. Brief of Appellant at 2225. Such a duty may be fulfilled by ensuring that warning signs are visible to
all travelers, not just a few, as well as by additional "policing" of the potentially
hazardous areas.
It is important to note, however, that nothing in the contract specifically
requires Calhoun to warn the public of hazardous conditions. Therefore,
Calhoun^ performance of this task suggests either that it assumed the
landowner's duty to warn of this particular hazard, or that it was aware it had
already assumed such a duty contractually. Either way, Calhoun assumed a duty
to warn the public of the hazardous condition of the airport floors on the day in
question.
Whether Calhoun exercised sufficient care in warning passengers or
policing the area is, of course, a question for the jury. But whether Calhoun
had a duty in the first place is a question of law for this Court. Given the fact
that Calhoun had already warned some members of the public, Appellant
Brittner contends it had a duty to adequately warn all members of the public.
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Appellant respectfully requests this Court to address this argument and
determine the existence of such a duty.

CONCLUSION

Calhoun assumed all responsibilities of a landowner: to protect the public,
to provide the labor needed to maintain high standards of cleanliness, to
maintain the premises in a dry condition, to provide regular maintenance, and to
remove spills. In addition, the terms of the contract establish that the standard
of care which Calhoun agreed to assume was "above average." Nothing in the
Contract says that Calhoun's duties are imposed only after notice or that they
are only "on call." Calhoun's services are required "upon request" or "as
needed." The Court must interpret the contract as a whole, giving meaning to
all terms and avoiding the creation of surplusage.
The Work Plan, which was created at the command of the contract,
specifically assigns an employee to "police" the area at the time the Plaintiff
fell. This "Court has mistakenly interpreted the term "police" as excluding the
duty to inspect for hazards. Such an interpretation is not supported by the
contract or by extrinsic evidence.
Finally, this Court failed to address the issue of Calhoun's duty to warn
travelers arriving by air of the increased hazards created by accumulated
snowfall. Calhoun had actual knowledge of such hazards, and had taken steps
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to warn some travelers. Appellant contends that Calhoun's actions create a duty
to warn all travelers or to take additional steps to ensure the safety of
passengers.
For all these reasons, Appellant Brittner respectfully requests the Court to
grant her Petition for Rehearing.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of March, 1996.

Lloyd J. Webb (#3408)
LLOYD J. and CURTIS R. WEBB
155 2nd Avenue North
P.O. Box 1768
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1768
AND
ROSSBACH & WHISTON, P.C.
401 North Washington

William A. Rossbach
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant
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